A Discussion of Lincoln and His Admirals by Craig Symonds
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I recently finished Lincoln and His Admirals by Craig Symonds, Professor Emeritus at the Naval War College in Rhode Island. In it he goes to great lengths characterizing a lesser-known aspect of the Civil War, namely the naval war. This is not to say that such actions have not been characterized previously, in fact, reading Symonds’ work has piqued my interest in the naval actions that took place during the war, with particular interest in the Confederate States Navy. What is different about Symonds’ effort however is that he does not simply dwell on the battles themselves, nor even their significance with regard to the greater war; instead, he focuses on how Lincoln managed, or in many ways did not manage, the riverine and blockade fleets, and why this was in line with his overall character.
Symonds hammers home the fact that Lincoln was, by all accounts, a man who preferred to be reactive with regards to events as opposed to try and guide them with his hand. This is evident when, toward the end of the war, he remarked that “I claim not to have controlled events, but confess plainly that events have controlled me.” This was not merely an errant statement, but one which Lincoln truly believed and preferred. It is well-known that the egos and wills of some of his generals, and admirals, necessitated his direct manipulation of events, however, this was never in accordance with the desires of the President. Symonds repeatedly notes that Lincoln preferred proactive military and naval leaders, even some who were overtly rash, over those who were cautious or bound by tradition. This is evidenced in which Flag Officers (later Admirals after the creation of the rank in 1862) curried the most favor with him. David Glasgow Farragut propelled himself to fame at the battle for the port city of New Orleans, when he, as Symonds puts it, “took the bit in his teeth and steamed past the forts at 2:00 A.M. on April 24, triggering a middle-of-the-night pyrotechnic eruption as the gunners in the forts fired at the dark shapes…and the ships fired at the muzzle flashes on the ramparts.” This, his later famous success at the Battle of Mobile Bay, and his disdain for politics (Lincoln already had far too many opponents as it was) made him one of the true golden boys in the eyes of the President. Despite Lincoln’s deft ability to gauge who his most trusted admirals were by their actions and resultant successes, he was not above playing favorites. John A. Dahlgren, an ordinance expert and the commander of the Washington Navy Yard, befriended Lincoln in earnest. However, using this relationship he was able to supersede Rear Admiral Samuel DuPont as commander of the renewed attack on Charleston in 1863, when DuPont fell out of favor with the administration for not taking direct action against the city despite his force of armored ironclad ships. Many scoffed at this appointment, including Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles, who felt that Dahlgren “did not have the sea service to justify it.”
Incidentally, this was often the role that Welles was forced to play; that of the “bad cop” to Lincoln’s “good cop.” Many of the navy’s admirals and officers felt that Welles was a rude and callous individual who was overly critical of their actions, and that the President was the one who supported them in their actions in the field and abroad when dealing with Confederate blockade runners. Though Welles was a man with strict moral guidelines as to how he lived his own life, and high expectations of how his officers must conduct themselves, the reputation he gained as a foe of the officers was often a fallacy. A clear example of this can be found in the writings of David Dixon Porter who characterized the Secretary of the Navy as “rude” and an “imbecile” who was trying to have him replaced. However, this was not the case. When Porter was attacked in a Cabinet meeting by Secretary of War Edwin Stanton, Welles protected the rear admiral by stating that he “agreed that Porter had his flaws, but insisted that he was also energetic and conscientious.” Porter would have been quite surprised had he known of this interaction. Symonds cites Welles’ journal writings frequently; a set of works I hope to attain at some point as they are an invaluable primary resource. It is evident in the frequent quotes that give us a view into how Welles interpreted specific situations, as well as how the different Cabinet members interacted with one another. Welles was a steadfast, gruff individual who I hope to learn more about in future readings.
Symonds’ work is a wonderful and thoughtful view into not just the mind of Abraham Lincoln, nor to the naval battles that comprised the maritime and riverine aspects of the Civil War, but accounts of both as they affected each other. While this makes it sound almost trite and simple, the feat which he accomplished is astounding in its scope (just look at the bibliography and I am sure you’ll agree). However, what is most important with regard to historical writing, and what Symonds accomplishes to masterful effect, is the fact that this work is entirely readable and absolutely enjoyable. The colorful characters which comprised the Lincoln Cabinet and the armies and navies of the Civil War are all brought to life. If you have any interest in the Civil War, Abraham Lincoln, or naval history (or any combination of the three) then I suggest you pick up this book and delve into the era of the Civil War from a wholly novel perspective.
Next year is the 150th anniversary of the Civil War and in recognition of that fact the 
